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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY:
POWER, INTEREST, AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN LIBYA
AND SYRIA
AMY E. ECKERT*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ("NATO") 2011 intervention in
Libya is widely regarded as a successful example of the international community
fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians against abuses perpetrated by their
own state. The responsibility to protect addresses certain shortcomings in the
concept of humanitarian intervention-the use of military force to address
humanitarian crises. The use of force to address grave violations of human rights
may often be too little, too late. By contrast, the responsibility to protect is a
continuum of actions (including, but not limited to, the use of force), which is
intended to address crises earlier and through a variety of different tools. The
NATO intervention, authorized by the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council,
responded to the Libyan government's attacks against civilian rebels inspired to
revolt by the events of the Arab Spring. Yet in other instances in which
governments responded brutally to pro-democracy protestors-notably Syria-the
role of the international community has been significantly less visible than in
Libya. While governments in both Libya and Syria responded with force to
unarmed civilian protestors, and are suspected of crimes against humanity, only the
former was the target of intervention by the international community, an action
that ultimately led to the demise of the regime.
The contrast between these two cases bears out the fact that the responsibility
to protect is subject to many of the same pitfalls as humanitarian intervention.
Critics of humanitarian intervention correctly pointed to selectivity in its
application as problematic. States intervened in instances where they had an
interest-humanitarian or otherwise-in intervening and the power to do so. The
selectivity that seems to plague action under the frameworks of both humanitarian
intervention and the responsibility to protect stems from the nature of the
international system, and the lack of a realistic alternative to state action in support
of either principle. While the responsibility to protect has advanced the debate
about support for human rights in some key respects, it is nevertheless subject to
some of the same pitfalls as humanitarian intervention with respect to
implementation.

*Amy Eckert is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Metropolitan State University of
Denver. She has a Ph.D. (International Studies) and a J.D. from the University of Denver, Sturm
College of Law. The author would like to extend her warmest gratitude to Ved Nanda, who originally
inspired her interest in the topic.
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This article begins with a brief overview of the two cases under consideration,
Libya and Syria. It then surveys the evolution of the debate about the international
community's role in responding to human rights violations, with an emphasis on
the emergence of the responsibility to protect. Finally, it takes up the dynamics of
the international system that frustrate a consistent application of the responsibility
to protect, perpetuating the inconsistency that subjected the right of humanitarian
intervention to criticism.
I.

THE ARAB SPRING

On December 17, 2010, Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
on fire after the government confiscated his goods. Bouazizi's death brought to the
forefront rage against the Tunisian government, which was widely viewed as
oppressive and corrupt.' A coalition of intellectuals, human rights activists, and
labor movements successfully toppled the government within a month of
Bouazizi's self-immolation. The anti-government sentiment was not limited to
Tunisia, and soon spread elsewhere throughout the Middle East and North Africa,
including Libya and Syria.
A. The Libyan Uprising
The Libyan regime of Muammar Khadafy did not escape the groundswell of
rebellion. On February 17, 2011, Libyans who were discontent with Khadafy's
rule held a "day of rage" protest in response to the government's human rights
abuses, which Amnesty International describes as having been a "hallmark" of the
regime.2 Protests continued in the city of Benghazi and quickly spread elsewhere
throughout Libya, and they were met with brutal repression. In Benghazi, security
forces killed at least 109 protestors, some of whom had been protesting
peacefully.3 Protests, and the ensuing brutal government crackdowns, spread
throughout Libya, eventually reaching Tripoli. On February 22, after nearly a
week of protests, Khadafy criticized the protests for threatening Libya's interests
and pledged to "purge Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by household,
alley by alley, and individual by individual until the country is purified."4 In
support of that pledge, government forces resorted to brutally repressive tactics
against the opposition.
By late February, anti-government rebels controlled much of Libya, though
government forces would eventually retake much of the territory that the rebels
had gained. The brutality of the Libyan government's response, particularly its
strategy of targeting civilians, led the international community to intervene on
behalf of the rebel movement. In Resolution 1970, the U.N. Security Council

1. Kareem Fahim, Slap to a Man's PrideSet Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?pagewanted=all.
2. Amnesty Int'l, The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearancesand Torture, Al Index MDE
19/025/2011 (Sept. 13, 2011).
3. Id.
4. Id.

R2P

2012

INTHE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY

89

referred the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court for prosecution. 5
In addition, the Security Council imposed a weapons embargo and implemented a
travel ban and asset freeze for key individuals affiliated with the Khadafy regime
and suspected of violence against the protestors. 6
The following month, the Security Council adopted a second resolution on
Libya, Resolution 1973.' This resolution authorized U.N. Member States to use
"all necessary measures," including the use of force, to ensure protection of
civilians in Libya.8 The forcible intervention authorized by Resolution 1973 would
be carried out by NATO, which began striking Libya's air defenses two days later.9
NATO's intervention neutralized the government's advantage and paved the way
for a military triumph by the rebel movement in August, when they seized control
of Tripoli.
B. Rebellion in Syria
The Syrian government has also been beset by protests, and, like Libya, has
responded with brutal and repressive acts against civilians. Anti-government
protests began in Syria in March 2011, when a group of approximately 200
protestors called for the ouster of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad.' 0 As in Libya,
the government has responded harshly to the anti-government protests, not
hesitating to open fire on civilian protestors. Estimates of the number killed vary
widely, but even conservative estimates place the number of dead in the
In the words of Human Rights Watch, "the notorious security
thousands."
services, referred to generically as mukhabarat,and pro-government armed groups,
whom Syrians refer to as shabeeha, regularly used force, often lethal force, against
largely peaceful demonstrators, and often prevented injured protesters from
receiving medical assistance." 2 According to witnesses, the security forces utilize
lethal force against protestors even when they are not threatened by the
protestors. 13

5. S.C. Res. 1970,1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
6. Id. 119-21.
7. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011).
8. Id. 114.
9. David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Erlanger, & Elisabeth Bumiller, Allies Open Air Assault on
Qaddafi's Forces in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/03/20/world/africa/ 20libya.html?pagewanted=all.
10. Elizabeth Flock, Syrian Revolution: A Revolt Brews Against Bashar al-Assads Regime,
WASH. POST BLOG (March 15, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/
syria-revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al--assads-regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX blog.html.
I1. Syria Uprising: UN Says Protest Death Toll Hits 3,000, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011, 01:44
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15304741.
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE LIVE AS IN WAR: CRACKDOWN ON PROTESTORS IN THE
GOVERNORATEOF HoMs 10 (2011).

13. Id. at 18.
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Unlike Libya, the U.N. Security Council did not adopt a resolution on Syria
because proposed action was blocked by Russia and China.14 The failure of the
U.N. to respond has, apparently, only emboldened the al-Assad regime in its brutal
crackdown on protestors.' 5 Although the Security Council has not adopted a
resolution addressing the uprising in Syria, it did issue a presidential statement
expressing concern about the deteriorating situation in Syria and urging the
government to negotiate a ceasefire.' 6 The statement also had the support of
Russia and Syria, the two states that had vetoed previous Security Council efforts
to act on the Syrian crisis. To secure that support, the presidential statement was
devoid of threats or demands.17 Undeniably, the response of the international
community to the violence in Syria has been tepid when compared with the
response to similar crimes in Libya.
II.

FROM HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The responsibility to protect grows out of a longstanding right of
humanitarian intervention. While state sovereignty has long included the right of
states to exercise broad discretion with respect to the treatment of their nationals,
this discretion has never been unlimited. Instead, international law has also
recognized the right of states to intervene when a state's treatment of its nationals
shocks the conscience of mankind. Originally, states exercised this right with
respect to certain minority populations who were the targets of abuse by their
governments. Over time, the nature of intervention changed as the concepts of
humanity and human rights altered. Certainly, the instances of human rights
violations have overwhelmed the occasions on which some state or group of states
has intervened in response to those violations. The selective nature of outside
intervention in response to humanitarian crises encouraged critics of the right to
humanitarian intervention, including Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley, who
suggested that the existence of such a right would "come as a surprise to Biafrans,
Rhodesians, and South Africans."' 8 Particularly during the Cold War, those cases
in which outside powers did intervene, such as India's intervention in East
Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, occurred without the
authorization of the U.N. Security Council, raising issues regarding the legality of

14. Neil MacFarquhar & Anthony Shadid, Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/
syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html.
15. Anthony Shadid, Syrian Unrest After a Failureof Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/middleeast/syria-steps-up-crackdownafter-failed-un-motion.html? pagewanted=all.
16. Rick Gladstone, U.N. Council Backs Planfor Ending Syria Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2012, at Al2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/world/middleeast/in-moment-of-unitysecurity-council-endorses-plan-to-halt-syria-conflict.html.
17. Id.
18. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 296 (1973).
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such operations under the U.N. Charter.' 9 NATO's intervention in Kosovo, which
was not sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, also raised similar questions with
respect to the legality of humanitarian intervention under the U.N. Charter.
A. HumanitarianIntervention during the post-CharterEra
The role of interest in motivating intervention emanates from the nature of the
international system itself. In the absence of a central authority to implement
norms such as human rights standards, the enforcement of these norms falls to
states. A state's action is motivated by its interests. While these interests will
certainly include an interest in human rights, humanitarian interests alone are
rarely sufficient to motivate a state to intervene abroad. Forcible intervention in
support of human rights requires that a state expend its resources and place at risk
the lives of its military personnel, something a state will not likely do in the
absence of self-interest. As Franck and Rodley note, "in a surprising number of
instances where the humanitarian factor was great but no threat existed to the
political or economic concerns of foreign powers, states have evinced little interest
in forceful surgical intervention." 20 For Franck, the potential for abuse was a
serious objection to the right of humanitarian intervention.21 This absence of selfinterest is one reason why states did not always intervene in instances of grave
human rights violations, leading to uneven enforcement of human rights norms.
Subsequent practice diminished this objection, but has not entirely overcome it.22
The problem of selectivity remains.
19. A number of legal scholars argued that the creation of the U.N. Charter, which does not
explicitly address the question of humanitarian intervention, had extinguished any right to use force in
response to human rights violations in the absence of Security Council approval. See IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John N. Moore ed., 1974); Franck
& Rodley, supra note 18; Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw: The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984). This argument leads to the absurd result of diminishing the capacity of
states to act in support of one of the U.N. Charter's major purposes, which is promoting respect for
human rights. As such, a number of other scholars, including this author, supported a continuing right
to humanitarian intervention even in the absence of Security Council authorization. Richard B. Lillich,
HumanitarianIntervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Pleafor Constructive Alternatives, in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 238 (John N. Moore ed., 1974); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible
Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967); Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F.
Muther, Jr., & Amy E. Eckert, Tragedies In Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under InternationalLaw- Part II, 26 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 827 (1998); W. Michael Reisman, Comment: Coercion and Self-Determination:
ConstruingCharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
20. Franck & Rodley, supra note 18, at 279.
21. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND

ARMED ATTACKS 172, 185-86 (2002); Thomas Franck, Comments on Chapters 7 and 8, in UNITED
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264, 265, 267 (Michael Byers &

Georg Nolte eds., 2003); Thomas M . Franck, Interpretationand Change in the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 229-

31 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
22. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.
2002 at 99, 100.
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B. Responsibility to Protect
The stagnant nature of these debates prompted the emergence of the concept
of a "responsibility to protect." The shift in terms of the debate was an attempt to
transcend some of the ongoing disputes about the legality and the desirability of
the right to humanitarian intervention.

1. ICISS Report
First articulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty ("ICISS"), the concept of responsibility to protect emphasizes that
responsibility for individual welfare is shared.23 The ICISS sought to shift the
emphasis from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility for the lives
and well-being of the state's citizens. 24 The primary responsibility for any
particular individual lies with that person's own state. Where a state abdicates that
responsibility, then the international community has a responsibility to act. The
responsibility to protect encompasses three separate obligations. The first of these
is the responsibility to prevent. The ICISS emphasized that this obligation also has
an international dimension including development assistance, other forms of
support, and efforts at conflict resolution like mediation or good offices. 25
The second responsibility, which comes into play when the preventive
measures fail, is the responsibility to react, which includes a range of different
coercive measures. The ICISS includes political, economic, judicial or military
measures, but it emphasizes that the latter should be deployed only in extreme
circumstances. 26 With a view to defining these extreme circumstances, the ICISS
proposed several criteria for the utilization of military coercion:
* Military intervention should be undertaken for a just cause, meaning to
stop or prevent large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. 27
* Intervention should occur pursuant to right authority. 28
* Those employing military coercion should do so with the right intention,
the existence of which is supported where intervention is multilateral
rather than unilateral, and where interference with territorial integrity and
political independence is minimized.29

23. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 17 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT].

STATE

SOVEREIGNTY,

THE

24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 53-54. The question of right authority is a complex question in light of the political
obstacles that may preclude working through the U.N. Security Council. In the present cases under
consideration, the Security Council supported intervention in Libya, but not in the equally grave
situation in Syria. Where the Security Council fails to fulfill its own responsibilities, the ICISS allows
for intervention under the authority of the General Assembly or regional organizations and, in
exceptional cases, by ad hoc coalitions.
29. Id. at 35-36.
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* Military force should be a last resort after prevention and peaceful means
have failed.30
* The military intervention should be proportional to the humanitarian
objective.3
* There should be a reasonable chance of success, meaning that actual
protection should be achieved as a result of the military action.32
Finally, the responsibility to protect also includes a responsibility to rebuild
following intervention. 33
The ICISS points to three key advantages of this new conceptual framework.
The first advantage over humanitarian intervention is that the responsibility to
protect shifts the focus of action from the state that holds the right to those in need
of protection.34 Second, the responsibility to protect underscores the fact that
primary responsibility remains with the state whose nationals are in need of
35
protection. Finally, the responsibility to protect is a much broader concept than
humanitarian intervention.3 6 The responsibility to protect seeks to broaden the
scope of action taken in response to humanitarian crises, encompassing a range of
various responses to a continuum of disasters. While it includes a duty to react to
humanitarian crises, the responsibility to protect also includes obligations to
prevent and to rebuild, which have been lacking in the discourse surrounding
humanitarian intervention. The incorporation of measures other than the use of
force diminishes the "all or nothing" nature of the choice between forcible
intervention and inaction in response to humanitarian crises. Instead, states have a
broader range of options from which to choose, many of which would apply at an
earlier point in a crisis.
The key contribution of the ICISS report was to reframe sovereignty in such a
way as to resolve the seemingly intractable opposition of sovereignty and human
rights. 37 Subsequent interpretations of the responsibility to protect accepted this
interpretation of sovereignty, but would differ from the ICISS report in important
respects.
2. U.N. High-Level Panel
The norm of the responsibility to protect was subsequently affirmed by the
U.N.'s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, whose report
echoed the ICISS treatment of sovereignty as a source of obligation, advocating
collective responsibility where a state was unable or unwilling to fulfill its

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Evans & Sahnoun, supra note 22, at 101.
Id.
Id.
Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84

INT'L AFF. 615, 620 (2008).
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responsibilities. 38 The panel recognized a growing consensus in favor of the
responsibility to protect, as well as inconsistency on the part of the Security
Council.
It outlined a set of criteria similar to the ICISS's for military
intervention in support of the responsibility to protect, with one important
exception. Where the ICISS was willing to confer legitimacy on actors other than
the Security Council, the panel rejected this move. Instead, the panel recognized
that "there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the
Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of
international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved
powerless or unwilling to prevent." 4 0
This statement constitutes a more restrictive view of right authority than that
employed by the ICISS, but in other respects, most significantly with respect to
just cause, the high-level panel echoed the proposals of the ICISS report. Both
documents support the international community's responsibility to act in the face
of large-scale humanitarian disasters that states are unwilling or unable to
prevent.4 1
3. The Secretaries-General on the Responsibility to Protect
Secretary-General Annan subsequently endorsed the responsibility to protect
as well, though he emphasized the non-military components of this obligation by
placing his discussion of the responsibility to protect primarily within the context
of freedom and dignity rather than the section on the use of force. 42 The SecretaryGeneral endorsed the responsibility to protect as well as the concept of shared
responsibility set forth by the ICISS and the high-level panel.43 Later that year, the
General Assembly also endorsed the responsibility to protect in two key
paragraphs of its World Summit Outcome document, affirming that "[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." 44 The document goes on to
recognize the shared responsibility of the international community to act, but
rejected a systematic approach to implementing this responsibility, favoring
instead a "case-by-case" approach.45
The Security Council subsequently
reaffirmed the relevant provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit

38. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD:
OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2004), available at www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

39. Id. at 65-66.
40. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
41. Id.; ICISS REPORT, supra note 23, at 69.

42. Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: PoliticalRhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 107 (2007).
43. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human
Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 1 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005).
44. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
45. Id. 139.
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Outcome document in Resolution 1674,46 which it recalled in its subsequent
Resolution 1706 on the situation in Darfur. 47
The current U.N. Secretary-General has also addressed the responsibility to
protect, particularly the issues of developing early warning mechanisms and
implementing the responsibility to protect. 48 With respect to the question of
implementation, Ban Ki-Moon noted that institutions had failed in the past,
particularly in the tragic case of Rwanda. 49 The Secretary-General attributed these
failures partly to the conceptual framework of humanitarian intervention, which
created what he called a "false choice" between using coercive force or standing by
and observing unfolding human tragedies.50 Drawing on paragraphs 138 and 139
of the Summit Outcome document, Moon suggests three pillars to the
responsibility to protect:
* The first emphasizes the state's responsibility to protect its own population
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing, as well as the incitement of any of these offenses.5'
* The second underscores the responsibility of the international community
to assist states in meeting their obligations under the first pillar. 52
* The third and final pillar requires U.N. Member States to respond in a
"timely and decisive manner" when a state has manifestly failed to
provide protection to its population, using the broad array of tools at their
disposal.
It is this third pillar that is implicated in the Libyan and Syrian crises. Within
this pillar, Moon emphasizes the potential utility of referring situations to the
International Criminal Court, in addition to other non-forcible measures. Moon
attributes special responsibility to the permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council, arguing that both their permanent representation on the Security Council
and the privilege of the veto confer special responsibility on them. Because of this
special responsibility, he urges these members to "refrain from employing or
threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations
relating to the responsibility to protect." 54 Certainly, the refusal to support a
response to situations where states have failed to protect their populations is at
odds with a consistent and meaningful approach to the responsibility to protect, but
it underscores the problem that I take up here.

46. S.C. Res. 1674,114, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
47. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
48. U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of
the Secretary-General,1 19, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010).
49. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral,1 6, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
50. Id. 17.
51. Id. 11.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. 161.
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Moon's remarks on implementing the responsibility to protect suggest a
divide between past state practice regarding humanitarian intervention and present
and future practice regarding the responsibility to protect. Moon attributes
inconsistency in the case of the former to conceptual problems with humanitarian
intervention. I would suggest that the problem lies not with the concept, but is
instead a feature of both humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect
being carried out with a decentralized international system by states that are driven
by interests and power.
III. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The responsibility to protect has pushed the debate about humanitarian
intervention forward in a number of respects. Particularly important is this shift of
emphasis from a state holding a right to engage in humanitarian intervention to a
state bearing responsibility for the well-being of individuals, both at home and
abroad. These conceptual shifts have advanced the debate, but this does not
always translate into an improved response from the international community.
One point where the shift from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to
protect has had little impact is on the question of consistency, particularly with
respect to military intervention. Uneven application of the right to humanitarian
intervention was a serious problem even for its supporters, but the responsibility to
protect seems to fare little better in this regard. An interesting split within the
documents discussed in the previous section hints at the reasons behind this. The
ICISS report emphasizes the selection of certain criteria under which military
As outlined above, the cornerstone of these
intervention should take place.
criteria is the existence of just cause. In addition, the ICISS report takes into
consideration the issue of authority and several precautionary principles.56 By
contrast, the World Summit Outcome document, which most closely represents the
views of state leaders, rejects the imposition of systematic criteria, preferring
instead to evaluate each case individually.57 This speaks to the wish of heads of
state, and by extension states, to maintain discretion over when forcible
intervention will occur in response to human rights crises.
A more systematic approach would be consistent with the cosmopolitan
morality implicit in the responsibility to protect. The difficulty lies in the fact that
implementing this cosmopolitan morality falls to members of the international
system, namely states-both in their individual capacity and as members of key
institutions such as the Security Council. In the absence of a central authority in
It is states
the international system, the implementation of rules falls to states.
that would vote, as members of the Security Council, to authorize intervention, and
it is states, individually or in concert with others, who would execute that decision.

55. ICISS REPORT, supra note 23, at XII.
56. Id.
57. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 44, 1J 139.
58. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 72

(1977).
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One of the key insights of the realist tradition of international relations is that states
are driven by the pursuit of their interests. State interests certainly include
humanitarian interests, but they also include other, more material and self-oriented
interests, including the need to maintain their own security above all else.
Intervening in humanitarian crises like those in Libya and Syria may further
humanitarian interests, but, because such interventions require the expenditure of
troops and other resources, they do so at a cost to the states' own security interests.
This reality subjects the principle of the responsibility to protect to these dynamics
of the international system, particularly states' pursuit of their own interests.
The differing treatment of Libya and Syria bears out the inconsistencies that
are created by these features of the international system. In both states, the
governments have committed crimes against humanity against their own
populations by targeting civilians. In the parlance of the responsibility to protect,
both of these states are unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities toward their
citizens. Despite the fact that just cause exists in both cases, the Security Council
engaged in judicial intervention and authorized military intervention against Libya,
while declining to exercise the international community's responsibilities with
respect to Syria. The differing outcomes stem not from differences in terms of the
respective governments' treatment of their citizens, but from differences in the
international community's willingness to intervene. This willingness stems from
considerations like power and interest and, as these two cases suggest, they can
vary even in circumstances that are quite comparable. Entrusting the responsibility
to protect to self-interested states operating within a self-help environment, in
which their security interests trump other pursuits, means that the responsibility to
protect will not be applied any more consistently or systematically than was the
right of humanitarian intervention.
In these particular cases, there are differences in the strategic situation that
would render intervention in Syria more difficult, making the cost to states'
security interests higher. Intervention would not be so difficult as to raise
problems with the probability of success, one of the precautionary principles in the
ICISS report,59 but it would render military intervention more difficult. NATO
was able to intervene in Libya through the use of air power, without putting troops
on the ground. This would not be the case in Syria, where effective intervention
would require the deployment of ground forces. If the members of the Security
Council are unwilling to authorize military intervention, one might think that they
would authorize judicial measures, in the form of a referral to the International
Criminal Court, as they did with the Libyan situation. This refusal points to
another set of factors that undermines the willingness of the Security Council to
act, namely the political interests of Security Council members. In the Syrian case,
the interests of Russia and China, both permanent members of the Security Council
with veto power, precluded the Security Council from taking even this step.
Russia and Syria enjoy a longstanding alliance, as evidenced by Syria's use of

59. ICISS REPORT, supra note 23, at 37.
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Soviet weapons against rebels. 6 o If intervention were to occur, it would likely be
without the approval of the Security Council, and it would put those states carrying
out the intervention at odds with Russia. Beyond these ties between Syria and
Russia, even other states acknowledge that military action in Syria would be more
difficult and costly than it was in Libya.6 1 U.S. defense officials propose that even
an operation to protect civilians would require a sizable contingent of ground
troops. This stands in contrast to Libya, where NATO was able to intervene
without putting forces on the ground by relying on air power and weapons
launched from offshore.
The dynamics of the international system mean that state interests permitted
intervention in Libya, where intervention could be carried out at a relatively low
cost through air power, but they are so far obstructing intervention in Syria, despite
the existence of comparable crimes. Intervention in Syria would require a more
significant compromise of the security interests of Security Council members,
which has impeded the international community's ability to respond to the
atrocities being carried out by Syria. To date, the international community has yet
to respond to the Syrian government's systematic attacks on its own population
even with significant and effective non-forcible measures.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite key conceptual differences between humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect, implementation of the latter has not escaped the
unevenness and inconsistency of the former. The unevenness of states' assumption
of the responsibility to protect stems not from conceptual problems about
humanitarian intervention, but instead from features inherent in the international
system. As long as implementation of the responsibility to protect falls to states,
states will be guided by their interests, even in the performance of their
responsibilities vis-A-vis civilian populations abroad. In this sense, the problems
with humanitarian intervention were more than merely conceptual, and they
continue to plague the responsibility to protect.
While states are always guided by interests, it is important to note that those
interests are not always the same. 62 State interests can change over time, and
future developments within the international system may prompt a formulation of
state interests that is more consistent with a more even-handed approach to the
responsibility to protect. As Finnemore argues, the nature of intervention and the
rationale behind intervention abroad has changed over time, in part as the interests

60. David M. Herszenhorn, For Syria, Reliant on Russiafor Weapons and Food,Old Bonds Run
Deep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A13, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/
middleeast/for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www.
61. Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Points to Risks of a Syrian Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, March 11,
2012, at Al0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/us-syria-interventionwould-be-risky-pentagon-officials-say.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www.
62. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE
USE OF FORCE 5 (2003).
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of states evolved. The reasons for state intervention will continue to evolve, as
will states' conception of their interests. Without such evolution, the conceptual
advances embodied in the concept of the responsibility to protect will not likely
lead to a more consistent state practice.

